From Wagner’s whine to different coronations to unwelcome friends – This is what the continent has been talking about this week.
In today’s special supplement on the Turkish election, we analyse EU reactions to any possible scenario.
Troubles in Butcherland
Last week, Evgenij Prigozhin (for his flunkies, Evgenij the Butcher), Kremlin-linked businessman and owner of the mercenary company Wagner Group, publicly lashed out at the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of Staff, Valery Gerasimov, who are responsible for leaving his Wagner mercenaries short of ammunition in the battle of Bakhmut. Accusations flew, and insults were hurled. But more than the battered bodies on display in a showcase of world prominence, more than the imprecations of the St Petersburg ogre, it is the morning’s turning point that strikes: Putin’s ‘chef’ announces his withdrawal from Bakhmut as of 10 May.
However, over the weekend, behind a promise of new ammunition, the threat was withdrawn before being resumed on the occasion of the Victory Day (9 May), where Prigozhin candidly refers to Putin as ‘happy grandpa’ before being threatened to be regarded as traitor if Wagner their positions in Bakhmut. It is evident the discontent that has been simmering among Putin’s closest oligarchs, who are increasingly impatient with the Russian military’s problematic handling of the conflict against Ukraine: with every day that passes without victory, oligarchs lose money, power, and spheres of influence.
Prigozhin does not want to pass as the man who surrendered Bakhmut to the Ukrainians. And that is why he blames Shoigu and Gerasimov. If Putin cannot suture the wound, he will eventually (very soon) must make a choice. The feeling is that the mercenary leader is convinced that the Kremlin will give in to his demands, unable to give up the only result that today, after more than a year of war and thousands and thousands of dead, seems to be ‘within reach’.
Troubles in hell.
Game of Thrones
On Saturday, the UK and the world stopped for a couple of hours to witness what can be considered to all intents and purposes, a historical event: the Coronation of Charles III as King of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. More than 2,000 guests were invited to Westminster Abbey on 6 May. Among them were members of the royal family (and other members of royal families worldwide), representatives from the Houses of Parliament and the Church, and prominent politicians from the Commonwealth and beyond. The number of Coronation invitees was relatively small, given that more than 8,000 people attended the Queen’s service in 1953. After approximately 1,200 years and 62 monarchs, the most enduring monarchy in the world retains all its charm and prestige.
On a different note, another person is aiming for the throne: Ursula von der Leyen. The current President of the EU Commission, who was there at the coronation ceremony of Charles III and perhaps charmed by so much adulation, wants to serve another term and will most likely be the 2024 Spitzenkandidat of the centre-right EPP party for the top job.
Chosen by EU leaders in a closed-door process after the last European election in 2019, von der Leyen has accumulated unprecedented powers since she came to office, making hugely consequential decisions on health, defence and industrial policy that traditionally would have been left to national capitals. The European Commission president’s likely bid for a second term looks more and more like a coronation than a democratic deliberation. Besides the EPP’s almost-full endorsement, German Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron seem ready to back von der Leyen for a second term after a series of positive signals.
Who will most likely be left holding the bag? European Council President Charles Michel. But no worries: EU (sliding) doors are always open.
Your friends are not welcome
The EU seems finally ready to grow some stones: for months, the EU has resisted American pressures to punish Chinese entities for their role in aiding Russia’s war against Ukraine. That status quo may be on the cusp of a change: the European Commission has added eight Chinese companies in a draft for the upcoming package of sanctions that are seen as having circumvented EU sanctions against Russia’s procurement of dual-use goods, including microchips. The list, first reported by the Financial Times, is under discussion between the EU members this week.
Although just a draft, the only fact of having conceived the list sends a strong signal about the block’s readiness to go beyond Russian entities in laying out future action plans. If adopted, EU national governments will be bound to deny authorisation for these Chinese entities to engage in energy, tech or space-related transactions unless they can prove that the Russian military would not be the end user (alles gut, Mr Orbán?).
As expected from Beijing, the Foreign Ministry has already called for severe measures if the baby sees the light.
Diplo focus: Turkish election
Whatever happens, the presidential elections in Turkey on 14 May will be a problem for the European Union. According to the polls, the outgoing president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his primary opponent, Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, are neck and neck ahead of next Sunday’s first round. The possible runoff is scheduled for 28 May. In addition to the presidential elections, the Turks are called upon to renew parliament, where Erdogan’s AKP is in danger of losing its majority. Several newspapers in recent days have begun to conjure up the scenario of a defeated Erdogan, who disputes the result and clings to the power he has held for 20 years, transforming Turkey from an emerging democracy into an increasingly authoritarian regime.
Is the EU ready for a victory for Kiliçdaroglu at the head of a six-party opposition alliance? Is it prepared for a third presidential term for Erdogan after eleven years as prime minister? Is it ready for a Trumpian conflict over election results but without the vital institutions that serve as countervailing powers in the United States?
On paper, Erdogan is an ally of the EU, valuable when one considers Turkey’s position, its military might, and its ability to always be in the right place at the right time. With Erdogan and the AKP, the EU has developed a vademecum of behaviour, which often changes depending on the profile the Turkish president wants to show, between domestic and international. But Erdogan and the AKP have also proved unreliable, unpredictable, and sometimes even hostile interlocutors towards the EU and its member states. Authoritarian drift, internal repression, use of migrants as a weapon of blackmail, intervention in Syria, military campaigns against the Kurds, friendship with Vladimir Putin, veto against Sweden’s membership in NATO: despite being formally an EU candidate country, Erdogan’s Turkey has increasingly distanced itself from Europe and its interests.
Kiliçdaroglu has made promises that are appealing to Brussels, such as meeting all the benchmarks required by the European framework for the anti-terrorism law that, to date, mainly affects the opposition and dissidents. The aim is to obtain the liberalisation of entry visas to the Schengen area from the EU for Turkish citizens. In the memorandum of understanding of the Table of Six, the alliance of the opposition parties, there is provision for realigning Turkey’s order to EU standards as prescribed by the 35 chapters of the accession negotiations, even if the Twenty-Seven should continue to keep the door closed to Turkey’s entry. Regarding domestic policy, the European alignment can only please Brussels, but Kiliçdaroglu risks being a problem in foreign matters. His foreign policy of ‘non-intervention in the internal affairs of neighbours’ could mean a continuation of Erdogan’s ambiguity on Russia and Ukraine.
The EU does not appear ready to respond to the three scenarios of an Erdogan confirmation, a Kiliçdaroglu victory or a contestation of the results. The main priority remains Ukraine, and consequently, all calculations revolve around Russia’s war of aggression: the EU is unlikely to raise its voice too loudly if Erdogan turns into the Turkish Trump. But whichever scenario materialises, in the aftermath of the presidential elections, the EU could find itself with a second geopolitical earthquake on its borders after Russia’s war against Ukraine.
