In today’s edition, we analyse current events in the Middle East through the lens of the European Union’s response. This allows us to explore the possible consequences of a broader regional conflict for the Continent and reflect on the EU’s posture on foreign affairs.

Europe’s Response to Middle East Turmoil: A Call for Strategic Reinvention

Israel declared a state of war for the first time since 1973 after the Islamist terrorist organisation Hamas launched an unprecedented attack from Gaza, killing at least, to date, more than 1,400+ people and taking elderly people, women, and children hostage. Last Saturday was the deadliest day since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, and the death toll continues to rise daily.

On social media, images continue to flow in of the massacre of 260 young people during a music festival in the desert and of children beheaded and displayed as trophies by the Islamic Jihad.

However, the emotionality of these days cannot exempt us from reflecting on the European Union’s strategic set-up vis-à-vis what is happening in the Middle East and on the potential repercussions in Europe in case of a broader regional conflict.

The block started to struggle in its diplomatic response to the events unfolding in the area since 2005, when Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza. At the time, EU’s top officials believed Israel’s disengagement was a positive step towards a “two-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The problem was that less than two years after this event, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by – physically – eliminating most Fatah members, the Palestinian Authority dominating party currently governing the West Bank, which is the sole one to have formally recognised Israel’s right to exist.

Over the years of growing instability in the area, the EU has always looked hesitant to articulate a coherent foreign policy, given the diverse – and sometimes diverging – national interests and the role of “mere” coordination of the Member States that the EU High Representative can play, resulting in a cacophony of contradictions on multiple occasions.

In the wake of Hamas’ massacre last weekend, European Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi announced on Monday that the bloc would “immediately” suspend €691 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority. A few hours later, Slovenian Commissioner Janez Lenarčič contradicted his Hungarian colleague, insisting the aid “will continue as long as needed” and receiving the quick support of the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

In this already intricate diplomatic context, we should not forget that part of the EU  is already militarily involved in the area: Italy, France, and Spain are among the countries with the most significant numbers of troops taking part in the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon, the UN peacekeeping mission established on 19 March 1978 to guarantee the stability of the northern border with Israel. A key issue will be the ability of the UNIFIL contingent to ensure that the Lebanese jihadist group Hezbollah cannot send the necessary weapons to Hamas through Iran to sustain a protracted war. First, this would most likely require a review of the current mandate of the UNIFIL mission in the near future, which is now mainly limited to ensuring the respect of the current borders between Israel and Lebanon.

Besides that, we cannot ignore the potential consequences that a broader regional conflict would have on European countries. Natural gas prices in Europe have been climbing over the week due to growing concerns in the area: notwithstanding the disconnection from the Russian gas supply, the Old Continent remains nonetheless heavily dependent on imported fuel and could see higher prices persist in the event of a colder-than-average winter or, worst case scenario, skyrocketing tariffs to new highs in case of the expansion of the conflict to a regional level.

We could witness a similar outcome but for different reasons, if we look at the global oil market: while Israel doesn’t have a significant oil production industry, and there is no major international oil infrastructure in proximity to the Gaza Strip or southern Israel, the eruption of a significant conflict in the region still carries consequences for the stability of the worldwide oil market. This can be attributed to two key factors. Firstly, the global energy markets have shown a consolidated tendency to react unfavourably to disturbances in the Middle East due to the region’s contribution of approximately one-third of the world’s oil production. Secondly, global energy markets would express concerns about the potential involvement of Iran in the ongoing conflict.

If Iran becomes implicated in a long-term regional conflict against Israel, it could generate a regional domino effect that could drag other Arab countries – such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE – into the conflict. Also, If we add to this the fact that almost 50% of the oil global trade goes through these countries (notably, the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz chokepoints around the Arabian Peninsula), this scenario could drive global oil prices to reach or surpass the $100 per barrel mark, exacerbating inflation and adding new fuel to the challenges central banks face in managing and curbing it.

And, in the final analysis, Hamas’s terrorist aggression once again confronts the EU with the reality of an increasingly dangerous multipolar world, against which it struggles to adapt its old strategic concepts. As Israel was preparing to respond very harshly to Hamas in the Gaza Strip over the weekend, the EU’s support turned into calls to avoid escalation and relaunch the Middle East peace process.

The shock of the aggression against Ukraine served to shake the EU out of its illusions about Russia. But in the rest of the world, the EU continues to rely on “old-school diplomacy”, such as appeasement with Iran, multilateralism, and diplomatic negotiations as the solution to issues that, in that area of the world, are rooted in secular religious, social, and territorial disputes.

There is an urgent need for the EU to update its strategic strategy to the ferocity of a world in which the United States is no longer gendarme and in which anti-freedom and anti-democracy forces are on the offensive.

It is especially on Iran that the EU needs a strategic update. While EU top figures like Charles Michel and Josep Borrell were calling over the weekend to avoid escalation, the Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, was on the phone with Hamas and the jihad leaders to congratulate them on the attack as it ‘marks a unique milestone in 70 years’.

The EU’s current approach to Iran is exclusively geared towards trying to resuscitate the 2015 nuclear deal. Everything else takes a back seat, from Iran financing Hamas and Hezbollah to Tehran’s military support for Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Donald Trump’s election to the White House in 2016 and Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022 convinced the EU of the need to equip itself with strategic autonomy: being able to speak consensus omnium on foreign policy and defence, becoming more assertive in global affairs. The European Union’s foreign policy relies on the conviction that a rules-based, multilateral world order is still possible. On the contrary, European capitals must prepare for an increasingly multipolar world in which multiple centres of power compete between themselves on the world stage. Recently, we have witnessed the enlargement of the BRICS block, or again Turkey playing the central role in the diplomatic efforts to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiating table.

Let us hope that the EU will know how to better play its cards in the future.

From the place where we are right

Flowers will never grow

In the spring.

The place where we are right

Is hard and trampled

Like a yard.

But doubts and loves

Dig up the world

Like a mole, a plow.

And a whisper will be heard in the place

Where the ruined

House once stood.

The Place Where We Are Right – Yehuda Amichai